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Abstract
Many organizations collect data on in-
dustrial incidents. These organizations 
differ from each other in their interests, 
data collection procedures, definitions, 
and scope, and each of them is analyz-
ing its data to achieve its goal and to 
accomplish its mission. However, there 
were no attempts to explore the poten-
tial hidden in integrating data sources. 
Extensive efforts are required in order 
to integrate information from differ-
ent data sources as well as to identify 
the effects of the individual aspects 
of data collection procedures on the 
quality and completeness of the data. 
This work presents a methodology for 
incident data collection from various 
sources, and the opportunity that exists 
in a combined data mart for industrial 
safety performance assessment and 
identification of trends.  It also presents 
the major challenges associated with 
utilizing databases, furthermore inte-
grating these data sources for conduct-
ing industry-wide performance assess-
ments. The study also discusses how 
the proposed analysis can be used to 
determine the areas for major reduction 
of losses and number of incidents.
Introduction
The fallout of dioxin caused by a run-
away reaction at Seveso, Italy, in 1976, 
and the 1984 disaster of Bhopal, India, 
led to major changes in laws over the 
world. Federal and industrial entities 
devoted major efforts toward risk re-
duction and hazard control. Most of the 
organizations in the chemical industry 
integrated their systems for safety. 
Beyond measuring performance within 
facilities (Keren, 2003, 2009), and 
among facilities (Keren, 2002, 2005), 
most of the efforts in the development 
of safety performance measurements 
are invested toward measuring the in-
dustry as a whole and with some efforts 
directed toward performance measure-
ments of federal agencies.
The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) is a fed-
eral agency under the authority of the 
Department of Labor (DOL) and is 
responsible for the safety and health of 
employees in the work place. OSHA’s 
incident rate is a statistical index that 
measures illnesses and injuries per 100 
worker years (DoT, 2009). The Fatal-
ity Accident Rate (FAR) is a European 
index mostly used by the British and 
is a statistical index that measures the 
number of fatalities per 1000 employ-
ees working their entire lifetime (50 
working years per employee). Indices 
such as FAR and Incident Rate, which 
represent failure to effectively control 
risks, are called Trailing Indicators. 
These indices are important, and can 
be used to measure performance in 
industries. While OSHA’s Bureau of 
Labor Statistics produces several such 
indices, these indices are normalized, 
and are per industrial sectors. There is 
still a need for a framework that will al-
low to conduct estimation of variety of 
performance indices for more specific, 
yet inclusive, industrial arenas. A most 
desirable type of arenas are perfor-
mance indices for product-based (e.g., 
Chlorine, Ammonia, etc.). 
Newell (2001) presents a very well de-
veloped concept of process safety per-
formance measurements. In his work, 
he analyzes in detail OSHA’s database 
as a sole source of data for performance 
measurements. Newell recommends 
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using the OSHA rates for measure-
ments only as part of comprehensive 
balanced assessments that include other 
key information. Newell calls for use of 
leading, trailing and financial indica-
tors rather than trailing indicators only. 
His work is based on the balanced 
scorecard, which is best emphasized by 
“Accentuate the positive to eliminate 
the negative.” This concept has been 
widely used since the early nineties 
and is common to many suggestions 
for performance measurement systems. 
Newell’s work describes the features 
of the trailing, and leading indicators, 
but it does not actually develop the 
indicators. Although this work does not 
introduce the indicators, its contribu-
tion is significant in the phase where 
data sources are considered and in the 
phase of defining the indicators. Simi-
lar works have been done by Ritwik 
(2001), Walker, D. S., Schoolcraft, 
M., Casada, J. Leonard, & W. Hanson 
(2001), Morrison (2001), and Toellner 
(2001). All of these works contributed 
to some of the safety performance 
measurement in the process industry; 
however, none of them is comprehen-
sive, well defined, and developed.
The European Organization of Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) launched a project related to 
the development of Safety Performance 
Indicators for Chemical Accidents 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(Clement, & Lacoursiere, 2001; Gre-
nier, Jacobson, Jennings, & Schulberg, 
2001). OECD distinguishes between 
the industry and the public. It discusses 
the Canadian stakeholder view of ac-
cident prevention, emergency pre-
paredness, and response. Its indicators 
have many similarities to the OSHA’s 
Voluntary Protection Program (VPP). 
OECD introduces the general concept 
for safety performance indicators in the 
process industry (Clement, & Lacoursi-
ere, 2001). According to this work the 
project interim report should have been 
published in 2002, however, the report 
is yet not available.
Incident Data
Overview
Many organizations collect data on in-
dustrial incidents. These organizations 
differ from each other in their interests, 
data collection procedures, defini-
tions, and scope, and each of them is 
analyzing its data to achieve its goal 
and to accomplish its mission. There is 
an increased interest in using data on 
incidents to improve safety in the last 
20 years.  In the late 1980s, Marshal 
(1987) consolidated incident data 
from sixty or so years and harnessed it 
toward loss reduction, and loss preven-
tion. Today the interest is bigger than 
ever, because of the development of 
information technologies that look 
promising in their abilities to see what 
“unarmed human eye” cannot see. 
Major efforts are being invested toward 
collection of incident related data. The 
US Department of Health and Human 
Services, The Agency for Toxic Sub-
stances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) 
maintains Hazardous Substances Emer-
gency Events Surveillance (HSEES) 
and publishes annual and cumulative 
reports (http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HS/
HSEES/), and is only one among many 
other type of data collection projects 
that is maintained by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
The US Department of Transportation 
repository consists of a large number of 
transportation safety related databases, 
and many reports are available on their 
website (http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ 
). The last are only two from at least 
15 sources of information of incident 
related data that have been analyzed 
and incorporated in assessments of 
industrial safety performance. 
Assessment that is based on a methodol-
ogy of incident data collection from var-
ious sources is a thorough process that 
has to be done carefully and in several 
stages. Figure 1 presents a simplified 
process for utilizing incident data collec-
tion from various sources for industrial 
safety performance assessment.
The primary focus of industrial safety 
performance assessments that use the 
methodology presented herein is to 
establish a baseline metrics for the uni-
verse (scope of the dataset) under inves-
Figure 1. Methodology flow chart
Review of sources 
Database development 
Integration of data into the database 
Duplication identification and removal 
Estimate of 
total incidents 
Pattern 
identification 
Trend analysis 
Analysis and Conclusions 
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Table 1. Sources of Information and Databases
Source Database
Federal Emergency  
Management Agency (FEMA)
National Fire Information Reporting System (NFIRS)
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) * National Electronic Injury Surveillance  
System (NEISS)
* Death Certificates
* Investigation Summary
* Incident Summary
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC) News Clipping Database
States Associations Iowa and  Florida
State Agencies State of Texas 
National Response Center (NRC) Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS)
US Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events  
Surveillance (HSEES)
U.S. Department of  
Transportation (DOT)
* Hazardous Material Incident Reporting  
System (HMIRS)
* Integrated Pipeline Information System (IPIS) also known 
as Hazardous Liquid Accident Data (HLAD).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) *Risk Management Program (RMP)
  5-year Accident History
*Accidental Release Information Program (ARIP)
U.S. Department of Labor,  
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
Accident Investigation System and several other databases.
tigation with regard to safety.  This re-
quires identification of incident trends, 
distribution of number of incidents, 
number of injuries, property damage 
costs, releases of materials, hospitaliza-
tions, and evacuations. These should 
then be analyzed and correlated across 
the causes of incidents, equipment 
involved, initiating events, location, and 
other indicators. Several of the sources 
of information that are publicly avail-
able collect only part or a sample of the 
information. Further use of information 
from databases for safety performance 
assessments, (not industry-wide) are 
demonstrated by Keren and colleagues 
(Keren, West, Rogers, Gupta, & Man-
nan, 2003; Anand, Keren, Tretter, 
Wang, O’Connor, & Mannan, 2006; 
Keren, Anand, & Mannan, 2006, Man-
nan, O’Connor, & Keren, (2008), and 
Mills, O’Neil, Seider, Oktem, & Keren 
(2007)). 
Among the major conclusions from 
this study is to not be “misled” by the 
amount of data that a certain source may 
consist of.  One of the sources of infor-
mation provided about two-third of the 
data; however, it failed to collect signifi-
cant data (e.g., failed to collect data with 
severe consequences).  This conclusion 
justified the efforts that were required 
to broaden the search and combina-
tion of sources of information.  A novel 
data collection methodology, based on 
News Clippings, is using search engines 
to query newspapers according to a 
predetermined set of keywords.  The 
information is collected and submitted 
to the datamart.  This method has several 
advantages including the ability to fur-
ther investigate the incident or to verify 
the information if required. 
The study herein presents the devel-
opment of a methodology to assess 
industry-wide safety performance by 
applying the methodology above and 
by utilizing Set Theory applications on 
publicly available incident databases.
Sources of Information
The process of integration of data from 
several sources requires a thorough 
analysis of the databases that collect in-
formation on industrial incidents.  Table 
1 consists of a list of more than a dozen 
databases from ten sources that were 
integrated for an assessment project for 
a certain industry sector.  
These databases were selected because 
they contain information that could be 
used to establish safety performance 
metrics for the industry sector. The 
form of the data reflects the interest, 
purpose, and scope of the organization 
collecting the data. Thus, a through 
review of each one of the databases was 
required. Tables 2 and 3 present the 
results of reviews of NFIRS and News 
Clippings, respectively. Keren (2003a) 
presents an Analysis of all sources. 
The lack of national and international 
standard of reporting incidents, as 
Johnson (2002) mentions, has led to a 
lack of consistency among the sources 
with regard to coding used in the vari-
ety of fields.  As a result, major efforts 
are needed to create an infrastructure 
that will allow data from variety of 
sources to “sit” together in a datamart.  
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Table 2. An overview of NFIRS
Dimension Description
Covered  
Universe
In 1974 the USFA was authorized to gather data on US fire incidents. About 2 million incidents are collected 
annually from about 17,000 fire and emergency departments. The National Directory of Fire Chiefs and Emer-
gency Department is the most updated list of fire departments in the US. This list consists of about 35,000 fire 
departments and about 6,900 emergency departments.  About 50% of these departments are currently reporting 
to NFIRS from 50 states. 
Collection 
Method
Fire and emergency departments report on events that required their involvement. Some of the departments report 
directly to the system, others report to the state fire marshal, and his office submits the information to NFIRS. 
Principal Data 
Elements
Data collected on incidents for this database include the following:
Time and date
Address
Consequences
Damage estimation
Material involved
Fire/emergency department details
Location categories
Number of emergency personnel in the site
Equipment involved
Causes
Strengths NFIRS is a very extensive data collection source of material incidents. It is able to capture a large amount of 
data, and includes a very detailed location code. The damage estimation is quite unique. 
Weaknesses Even though NFIRS consists of a large number of incidents, it fails to capture many of the most significant 
incidents, and therefore is not as comprehensive as it might seem.
Table 3. An overview of news clippings database
Dimension Description
Collection 
Method
Collection methods vary somewhat among the sources. The archival sources present a short description of the 
clipping. Cases that are of interest are purchased/downloaded. Information was extracted from the sources 
and entered into the News Clipping database.  The free real-time sources gather articles from a much larger 
number of sources but only retain information for about 30 days.  Google searches more than 4,000 sources.
Principal Data 
Elements
The news-clipping database consists of several fields as well as an area for text descriptions. The information 
that is extracted is input to the following fields:
Name and address of facility, company or dealer
Date of incident
Fatalities, injuries, hospitalizations, evacuations, and sheltering
Distribution of the above among employees, contractors and general public
Principal Data 
Elements 
(continued)
Number of response units in the incident site
Release location
Nature of release
Cause
Material involved, and
State of material released
Strengths The news clipping procedure has several strengths:
News clipping provides real-time information that can be used to follow up on incidents. 
Quite often the name of the local responder, investigator, or reporter is available.
Allows direct contact to gain or confirm information, obtain investigative reports, etc. 
Gives text description of what happened
Focuses on notable incidents
Not just fires and explosions, but includes some near-misses as well
Internet search getting better with time
Weaknesses Information can be inaccurate or ambiguous, thus extensive efforts are required at times to clarify the information
Some of the sources retain the information for a short period of time
Converting news clipping to electronic form requires extensive human resources
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Figure 2 demonstrates the information 
flow until it reaches its final destina-
tion.  At almost every node the data is 
being converted, and the process must 
be done diligently in order to avoid 
misinterpretation of the data.
It is important to emphasize that the 
sources do not release the information 
as it becomes available.  A real-time 
data collection from various sources is 
a long process that takes at least three 
years, as can be seen in Figure 3.  Be-
cause of its real-time nature, the news 
clipping data collection system creates 
several opportunities: 1) Development 
of procedures for incident investiga-
tion for the real-time data collection; 
2) Identification of a need for incident 
investigation and performing investiga-
tion; and, 3) Follow-up on information 
to validate causes of incidents and 
long-term consequences.
In many of the records that were 
examined, question arose that could 
have been answered quite easily if a 
real-time data collection process had 
been in place. In several of the records, 
it was hard to determine what the cause 
is, or what the initiating event was. As 
an example, one of the records con-
tained data for an incident in Alaska. 
The record indicated 99 fatalities for a 
single incident. Since it is reasonable to 
assume that an incident with such large 
number of fatalities would be covered 
by the media as well as by incident in-
vestigation reports, a thorough research 
was conducted, which revealed that the 
incident actually resulted in a single 
fatality and 99 injuries.
Method of Duplication Identification 
and Removal
At the end of the data submission stage 
(Figure 3), it is required to identify and 
remove duplications. Johnson (2002) 
discusses many of the problems in-
volved in automation of the process of 
duplication identification.
There are two categories of duplica-
tions that are encountered during the 
Investigation 
reports 
Coast Guard Responders
All
Agencies 
Public  
Companies
IRIS National Response 
center 
Health 
records
News
Media
Fire 
Departments
CSB,
NTSB
DOT State 
Associations
/Agencies
HSEES
CDSC
OSHA
RPM
EPA
MKO
PSC
NFIRS 
DOE
Databases
HMIRS IPIS 
Databases
Consumption data
Surveys
Databases
Databases
Reports
NEISS
Incident
Summary
Death
Certificate
Injuries
Tracking, Filtering, Vetting, Merging, Translation 
Repository Public
Figure 2. Information flow chart.
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consolidation of incident information 
from a variety of sources:
•	 Duplications	within	the	sources;		
and,
•	 Duplications	among	different	
sources.
In general, it is much easier to identify 
duplications within the sources than 
amongst different sources. However, 
the process of identification of duplica-
tions is similar in both cases. Duplica-
tion within the same source has the 
same type of information and is much 
easier to identify. The duplication 
identification process is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
The number of records in the list of 
‘Suspected as Duplications’ is sensi-
tive to the timeframe that is employed. 
However, in order to verify that the 
time frame used is not arbitrary, an 
algorithm was written to conduct 
sensitivity analysis of the number of 
suspected as duplications to the time 
frame. The results are presented in Fig-
ure 5.  As Figure 5 reveals, the number 
of incidents that are suspected as du-
plications is highly correlated with the 
width of the time frame (RMS= 0.98).
                       
The slope of the correlated line can 
serve as a qualitative relative indica-
tor for the comprehensiveness of the 
database. Under the estimation that 
the probability of an incident to occur 
is not time dependent, the number of 
suspected duplication in a given time 
frame would increase as the portion of 
the universe of incidents increases. The 
slope of the curve becomes steeper as 
the comprehensiveness of the database 
increases.
Once the system creates a list of records 
that are suspected as duplications, the 
records are reviewed manually, and a 
decision with regard to these records 
are made. Records that are identified as 
duplications are marked, so queries will 
reveal only one of them.  Identification 
of duplicates becomes quite difficult in 
cases where time of incident is not given. 
As for duplicate identification within 
the databases, the process of verifica-
News Clips
Data Processing 
time
Data 
Releases by 
Agencies 
2003 2004 2005
Data Collection 
Process Begins Data Collection 
Process Ends
Figure 4. Procedure for identification of duplications.
Figure 3. Timetable of real-time data collection and analysis.
Define time window for 
duplication identification 
Create a list of records 
with similar geographic 
information within the 
time frame
Compare # of 
fatalities, injuries 
and other 
description.
Same?
Do records in the given 
time frame have similar 
geographic
information? 
Mark records as 
non-duplicates 
No
No
Yes
Add to 
“Suspected as 
Duplications” 
list
Move to 
next time 
frame
tion of whether incidents are duplica-
tions varies according to characteristics 
of the incidents.  NFIRS for example 
contains two types of duplications: 1) 
Fire department that reported the same 
incident more than once; and, 2) Inci-
dents that were suspected as duplicates, 
because more than a single fire depart-
ment reported the incident.
In the first case, the verification process 
is not complicated.  In the second case, 
however, it was necessary to conduct 
an Internet search for county maps in 
order to determine if it is reasonable 
that a fire department from an adja-
cent county would assist another fire 
department and also report to NFIRS. 
In the majority of the cases the distance 
between the counties was too far to as-
sume that the reports are duplicates.  
An important criterion for identifying 
duplications is the number of injuries 
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and fatalities.  If two incidents that have 
other similar characteristics also show 
exactly the same number of fatalities 
and injuries, there is a high likelihood 
that one of these incidents is a dupli-
cate.  The algorithm ignored incidents 
that have different number of injuries or 
fatalities.  A thorough manual verifica-
tion and quality control procedures 
were implemented to ensure that du-
plicates were identified accurately and 
that non-duplicates were not eliminated 
inadvertently.
As for duplications amongst differ-
ent databases, the process required 
relatively more extensive efforts, and 
each of the cases needed to be treated 
separately.
Methodology for Estimation of Total 
Number of Incidents
The process for estimating the total 
number of Industrial incidents in the 
Unites States can be done by applying 
Set theory rules. Figure 6 qualitatively 
illustrates a Venn diagram of the situa-
tion with incident databases: The gray 
area represents the total number of in-
dustrial related incidents in the US. The 
white areas represent the actual number 
of incidents in each of the respective 
databases. The number of incidents 
from each of the databases is a subset 
of the total number of incidents that 
this database would consist of if all 
incidents were reported to the source 
(the set). For example, NFIRS, which 
is a database that consists of reports 
from emergency departments, contains 
records from about 14,000 fire depart-
ments from 42 states. The records in 
NFIRS are a subset of a set, which 
is the number of records that NFIRS 
would consist of if all 29,000 fire 
departments as well 6,900 emergency 
departments from the 50 states reported 
every Industrial incident to NFIRS (in 
1999).  
Figure 7 is an illustration of the relation 
between a set and a subset.
The Universe is a collection of all 
incidents that have the potential to 
be reported.  Therefore, Universe is a 
composition of sets.  The translation of 
Figure 5. Sensitivity to time frame.
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Figure 7. Relation between a set and a subset
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the above to the theory of set language 
is as follows:
a1  - is current records in database DB1
A1  - is the potential number of record 
in the database DB1, if all inci-
dents targeted by this database were 
reported.
a1 is a subset of A1   a1 ⊂ A1
a2  - is current records in database DB2
A2  - is the potential number of record 
in the database DB2, if all inci-
dents targeted by this database were 
reported.
a2 is a subset of A2  a2 ⊂ A2
The same principles applies to a3, a4,……, 
a
n 
or all the databases. The Universe S 
(Figure 8) is a composition of all the 
sets.  
However, there are overlaps among the 
sets, and therefore U is a union of the 
sets, as equation 1 in Figure 9 shows. 
Figure 10 presents the sequence of 
obtaining the information required to 
solve equation 1.
The following paragraphs describe the 
process for extrapolating the sets Ai 
according to the characteristics of each 
of the sources.  The assumptions that 
were required in order to extrapolate 
the intersections between the sets are 
presented later.
Extrapolation of Sets Ai: The purpose 
of collection of information is not the 
same for all the sources, and therefore 
the characteristics of each of these 
sources should be incorporated in order 
to calculate the number of incidents 
that the source database would consist 
of if it were to capture all the incidents 
that belong in its category.  A set of 
considerations, as well as the methods 
for extrapolating of information from 
the sets, Ai is developed individually.
Extrapolation of Duplicates:  The ideal 
way to extrapolate the number of du-
plications is to extract several samples 
of sub-sets and to identify number of 
duplicates for combination of sizes.  By 
using this methodology it is possible 
to study how the number of duplica-
tions increases with increase of the size 
of subsets.  However, in cases where 
the databases consist of relatively low 
Figure 8. The universe is a union of the sets (Venn Diagram).
Figure 9. Union of sets.
+Figure 10. Sequence of estimation universe S.
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
S
A1  A2
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The number of 
duplication that 
appeared in all of the 
databases
The sum of the number 
of duplicates between 
every combination of 
pairs of databases 
The sum of incidents from 
all databases prior to 
applying duplication 
identification procedure  
The sum of the number of 
duplications among every 
combination of three 
databases 
1)
Extract subsets ai
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Extrapolate 
Sets Ai
Study the 
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each of the sources 
Extrapolate 
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sets
Submit in 
equation 1 
Collect information 
on intersections 
between subsets
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number of duplicates, an approximation 
can be done by multiplication of the 
number of duplicates between sources 
by the ratio of the sum of the extrapo-
lated number of the incidents and the 
sum of the actual number of incidents 
in the database. 
Calibration of Information from 
Sources
When reviewing sources it is important 
to verify that the data represents the 
relevant population uniformly.  The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) - National Electronic Incidents 
Surveillance System (NEISS) is a col-
lection of injury data that are gathered 
from the emergency departments of 100 
hospitals selected as a statistical sample 
of all 5,300 U.S. hospitals with emer-
gency departments.  NEISS surveys 
sample of hospitals that represent all 
ethnic groups and concentrations of 
population, and it is statistically valid 
to extrapolate this data.  However, 
the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, National Fire Information 
Reporting System (NFIRS) database, is 
a collection of incident reports from fire 
departments.  About 50% of the fire de-
partments in the US, from 50 states and 
the District of Columbia are reporting 
incidents to NFIRS (http://www.usfa.
dhs.gov/fireservice/nfirs/about.shtm).  
These fire departments vary in size, 
ranging from departments that protect 
several dozen individuals (rural areas) 
up to departments that protect millions.  
Extensive efforts have been devoted to 
normalize the number of incidents from 
NFIRS based on population protected. 
Then, the inventory of all firefighting 
departments in the country was used to 
extrapolate the data and gain the total 
number of incidents. The process of 
extrapolation was repeated for each one 
of the sources based on the characteris-
tics of the source.  
Results
Figure 13 presents the result of imple-
mentation of the methodology of data 
collection from various sources on a 
petrochemical product (due to con-
fidential agreement, the name of the 
product could not be survived) for 
1999. The number of fatalities in Figure 
Figure 13. Distribution of fatalities by cause of death.
Table 5. Distribution of fatalities and injuries by victim category
Victim Category Number of Fatalities Number of Injuries
General Public 122 740
Worker/ Contractors 8 95
Fire Fighters/ Public responders 2 126
Unknown 5 51
Figure 14. Age distribution of the fatalities. 
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13 is 136. The number of fatalities prior 
to the implementation of the method-
ology was 276 (98 from the 276 have 
been reported in one incident). 
Table 5 present the distribution of fa-
talities and injuries by victim category. 
Figure 14 presents the age distribution 
of the fatalities.
Figure 15 demonstrates patterns of 
causes of incidents for the same prod-
uct. Similarly, further analyses can be 
done to determine the distributions 
above as well as other distributions for 
sub categories (i.e., distribution of fatal-
ity categories for fires, for explosions, 
etc.). 
The ability to conduct these types of 
analyses is very critical to determine 
effective lines of action and to develop 
intervention programs and regulations. 
Should the majority of the victims be 
emergency responder, the interven-
tion program will be different than the 
program that will be developed for the 
general public. Similarly, programs that 
address different age groups will vary 
in nature. 
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Further Research And 
Development
Extensive efforts are required to in-
tegrate information from a variety of 
data sources as well as to identify the 
effects of the individual aspects of data 
collection procedures on the quality 
and completeness of the data. A holistic 
approach that suggests an innovation 
of tools, methods, techniques, and 
procedures in order to extract informa-
tion from the large variety of sources of 
information is required. The principles 
as well as the methods of such a holis-
tic approach will be applicable to many 
disciplines such as civil engineering 
and insurance entities.  
In an era where information process-
ing power increases exponentially, it 
is hoped that the processes associated 
with the methodology above will be au-
tomated. Establishment of an automat-
ed procedure will tremendously reduce 
the efforts of integrating data sources, 
and make the process common. 
Summary
The methodology herein was utilized 
to conduct several safety performance 
assessments studies. These studies 
demonstrated that it is worthwhile to 
collect data from a variety of sources, 
and that much can be learned from the 
consolidated database. However, in 
order to accomplish the ultimate goals 
of safety performance assessment, the 
consolidated database must include root 
cause information. Conducting root 
cause analyses will be more effective if 
data is collected ‘real-time’. The need 
for a real-time data collection process is 
critical due to the short time that news 
clipping are stored in news archives and 
due to the need of further investigating 
incidents at times. The reliability of 
information gathered decreases signifi-
cantly with time. 
Implementation of the proposed meth-
odology yield an opportunity to de-
velop educated intervention programs, 
a capability that industries strive for.   
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